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Step Out of the Car: License, Registration, and DNA Please
Brian R. Gallini*
Imagine the following scenario: you are driving home after a long
day of work and are understandably anxious to arrive home. To
hasten the process, you step on the accelerator and progressively
increase your speed until you angrily spot blue lights behind you.
You compliantly pull your car to the side of the road, where
Officer Smith approaches, expresses his concern that you were
speeding, and asks for your license and registration. After
producing the requested items, Officer Smith retreats to his cruiser
where he enters your information into his cruiser’s computer and
learns that a warrant is out for your arrest on the charge of murder.
He does not, however, learn that the warrant clerk erroneously
entered your name.
Officer Smith returns and asks you to step out of your vehicle.
“What did I do?” you ask upon exiting the vehicle. Rather than
responding, Officer Smith places you under arrest for murder and
takes you down to the stationhouse for booking. Pursuant to
routine booking procedures, he takes your fingerprints,
photographs you, and then – to your surprise – inserts a cotton
swab into your mouth in order to gather a sample of your DNA.
Hours later you emerge from the stationhouse with wrists swollen
from handcuffs and a verbal apology from Officer Smith. But,
where did your DNA go? What enabled Officer Smith to invade
your person in the first place?
If your response is, “oh, that will never happen to me,” then you
are missing the point; other versions of this fact pattern are indeed
easy to fathom. Imagine, for example, that instead of the warrant
clerk committing a clerical error, Officer Smith simply thinks you
look like someone wanted for murder, sexual assault, or
kidnapping. Regardless of the scenario, though, each varied
hypothetical raises the same question: can officers conduct
suspicionless searches inside the body of your person following an
arrest for certain offenses, even if (1) the basis for the arrest has
nothing to do with the taking of your DNA, and (2) you are
ultimately later exonerated?
The Arkansas Legislature, by
enacting “Juli’s Law”, recently answered “yes” and, in doing so,
joined at least fifteen other states with similar statutes.1 Merely
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State Laws on DNA Data Banks Qualifying Offenses, Others Who
Must Provide Sample, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cj/dnadatabanks.htm (last
visited May 26, 2009).
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enacting the law, however, does not necessarily mean that it is
constitutional.
No Arkansas appellate court has examined the constitutionality of
the recently enacted House Bill 1473 – better known as “Juli’s
Law” – which allows officers to take DNA samples from suspects
arrested for capital murder, murder in the first degree, kidnapping,
sexual assault in the first degree, and sexual assault in the second
degree.2 This Essay contends that Juli’s Law violates the Fourth
Amendment of the federal constitution. Part I highlights certain
features of the statute and explores the rationale underlying its
enactment. Part II discusses the only published decision upholding
the practice of taking of DNA samples from certain felony
arrestees and the rationale for allowing the practice. Part III
assesses the possible analytical approaches to evaluating the
constitutionality of Juli’s law and concludes that any approach
yields the same result: taking DNA swabs from felony arrestees
prior to any conviction is unconstitutional.
I.
On the morning of December 20, 1996, Jewell “Juli” Busken
agreed to give one of her friends a ride to Will Rogers World
Airport in Oklahoma City.3 Juli left her Norman, Oklahoma
apartment before 5 a.m. and drove her friend to the airport in
Oklahoma City.4 She returned at approximately 5:30 a.m., at
which point neighbors remembered hearing a scream and a man’s
voice say “just shut up, get in the car.”5 A fisherman recovered her
raped and murdered body the next afternoon in Lake Stanley
Draper, nearby Oklahoma City.6
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America’s Most Wanted: Anthony Sanchez (The Case Overview),
http://www.amw.com/fugitives/case.cfm?id=27666 (last visited May 19, 2009);
see Jurors testify in case of slain Oklahoma ballerina Jewell "Juli" Busken,
NewsOK, May 18, 2009, http://newsok.com/jurors-testify-in-case-of-slainoklahoma-ballerina-jewell-juli-busken/article/3370479 (providing Juli’s full
name). Busken’s cases was featured on the January 25, 1997, episode of
America’s Most Wanted. Penny Owen, Slain OU Ballerina Delighted in Life,
NEWSOK, January 19, 1997, http://newsok.com/slain-ou-ballerina-delighted-inlife/article/1745353.
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Police on the scene were confused; they found her body in
Oklahoma City, yet discovered her car back in Norman.7
Investigators therefore believed Juli’s killer drove her car, a belief
later bolstered by a witness who told police, a month after the
crime, that he saw a man in Juli’s car at around the time of her
disappearance.8 Law enforcement also recovered a semen sample
from a pair of Busken’s tights.9 Although the investigation quickly
went stale, prosecutors – in order to avoid statute of limitations
problems – creatively charged a “John Doe” in March of 2000 with
murder, first-degree rape, forcible sodomy, and kidnapping, based
on the DNA sample.10
Four years later, Anthony Sanchez was already serving time for
burglary when he was ordered to submit to a blood test.11 The test
revealed a match between his DNA and the material recovered
from Busken’s tights.12 Prosecutors charged Sanchez following
the match and confirmed the match by using a cotton swab to
collect and test a sample of skin cells from inside Sanchez’s
7

Id.
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Id.; accord Penny Owen, Slain OU Ballerina Delighted in Life,
NEWSOK, January 19, 1997, http://newsok.com/slain-ou-ballerina-delighted-inlife/article/1745353.
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Jane Glenn Cannon, Attorneys say DNA test illegal; Defense team in
Busken murder trial want mouth swab results suppressed, THE OKLAHOMAN,
Dec. 28, 2005, at 1D; Jane Glenn Cannon, Gag Order Granted by Judge, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 21, 2005, at 10A; see Kendal Kelly, Oklahoma Student’s
Murder Case Will go to Trial, OKLAHOMA DAILY, Feb. 25, 2005 (explaining
that investigators developed a DNA profile based on bodily fluids and a hair
from the attacker).
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2003, at 4-A; Diana Baldwin, DA Files Rape Charge Against ‘John Doe’, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 16, 2004, at 6A. For a critique of the constitutionality of
indicting a DNA profile, see Andrew C. Bernasconi, Beyond Fingerprinting:
Indicting DNA Threatens Criminal Defendants’ Constitutional and Statutory
Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 979 (2001).
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Jane Glenn Cannon, Attorneys say DNA test illegal; Defense team in
Busken murder trial want mouth swab results suppressed, THE OKLAHOMAN,
Dec. 28, 2005, at 1D. State law at the time required all violent offenders and
those convicted of burglary to provide a blood sample for entry of their DNA
profile into a statewide DNA database.
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Return to Prison; Trial Ordered in OU Dancer’s Death, THE OKLAHOMAN,
March 31, 2005, at 9A; see Kendal Kelly, Oklahoma Student’s Murder Case
Will go to Trial, OKLAHOMA DAILY, Feb. 25, 2005 (noting that Sanchez
attempted to escape from prison after he was charged with Busken’s murder).
Specifically, a national database matched Sanchez’s DNA to the DNA he left on
Busken’s body. Kendal Kelly, Oklahoma Student’s Murder Case Will go to
Trial, OKLAHOMA DAILY, Feb. 25, 2005.
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mouth.13 Sanchez was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death
in 2006.14
Following Sanchez’s conviction, Oklahoma enacted the first
version of what it called “Juli’s law.” At first, the law required
only defendants convicted of sex offenses to provide DNA
samples.15 The Oklahoma legislature expanded the scope of Juli’s
law in 2005 by requiring all defendants convicted of felonies to
submit a DNA sample.16 Oklahoma is currently seeking to expand
the scope of its Juli’s Law by requiring DNA samples from (1)
defendants convicted of certain misdemeanors, and (2) arrestees
who are arrested on suspicion that they are in the country
illegally.17 Significantly, proposals in the Oklahoma legislature to
expand Juli’s law to include arrestee sampling have failed.18
At each juncture, proponents have relied on the value of DNA
evidence to justify expanding the scope of Juli’s law. To
rationalize amending Juli’s law the first time in 2005, for example,
one legislator commented in support of the amendment that “[b]y
adding DNA samples from categories we haven’t included in the
past, we’re greatly increasing our chances of solving cold cases.
DNA is what finally helped identify a suspect in the 1996 murder
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Jane Glenn Cannon, DNA Can be Used, Judge Says, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 27, 2006, at 11A.
14

Jane Glenn Cannon, OU Ballet Students’ Killer to Die, Jury Decides,
THE OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 18, 2006, at 1A; Jane Glenn Cannon, ‘Cold-blooded’;
Judge says jury spoke ‘loud and clear’ as he sentences Sanchez to death, THE
OKLAHOMAN, June 7, 2006, at 1A. Sanchez is now appealing his conviction by
arguing that he was denied a fair trial because, he alleges, jurors may have seen
him in shackles before they began deliberating. Jurors testify in case of slain
Oklahoma ballerina Jewell "Juli" Busken, NEWSOK, May 18, 2009,
http://newsok.com/jurors-testify-in-case-of-slain-oklahoma-ballerina-jewell-julibusken/article/3370479.
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THE JOURNAL RECORD, May 26, 2005.
16

Id.

17

Julie Bisbee, DNA Sampling Faces Henry’s Verdict, THE
OKLAHOMAN, May 17, 2009, at 5A.
18

Michael McNutt, DNA Sample Push Picks Up Steam in Oklahoma
House: Proposal Would Widen Criminal Testing, THE OKLAHOMAN, April 21,
2009, at 2A (“Proposals last year and this year to require people arrested on
certain felonies to provide DNA samples failed to pass.”). Oklahoma House Bill
3194 proposed extending DNA testing to any person arrested on a felony
complaint and booked in a jail. Michael McNutt, Measure honors memory of
slain OU student; DNA testing proposal clears House, THE OKLAHOMAN,
March 7, 2008, at 1A.
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of Juli Busken.”19 And, in May of this year, when the law was
extended to collecting samples from those convicted of certain
misdemeanors and arrested for illegal presence in the United
States, legislators again relied on the value of DNA evidence:
“I’ve seen just how extraordinarily helpful DNA is in solving a
crime.”20
Similar logic has driven efforts in Arkansas to expand DNA
sampling. Indeed, although Oklahoma’s current version of Juli’s
Law excludes arrestee sampling,21 Arkansas’s modified version of
Juli’s Law – also called Juli’s law – requires individuals arrested
for certain felonies to provide a DNA sample.22 Originally
introduced in February of this year,23 Arkansas House Bill 1473
was initially written to require the taking of DNA samples from
anyone arrested for any felony.24 At a press conference following
its introduction, Bill introducer and legislator Dawn Creekmore
commented, “DNA is merely a technologically advanced
fingerprint.”25 Although she acknowledged that the measure as
introduced would cost the state about $538,000 per year, she
argued that it would save money in the long term by shortening
criminal investigations and exonerating the wrongfully
convicted.26
The scope of House Bill 1473 was nonetheless subsequently
narrowed to requiring DNA samples from anyone arrested for any
of the following five felonies: capital murder, first-degree murder,
19

Journal Record Staff, OK Senate Backs DNA Database Expansion,
THE JOURNAL RECORD, May 26, 2005
20

Julie Bisbee, DNA Sampling Faces Henry’s Verdict, THE
OKLAHOMAN, May 17, 2009, at 5A.
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ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(a)(2)(A)-(E) (2009). Although Juli
Busken attended the University of Oklahoma, she is originally from Arkansas.
See Ken Raymond & Diana Baldwin, Inmate faces Busken charges; DA amends
‘John Doe’ counts in OU ballerina’s rape, death, THE OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 22,
2004, at 1A.
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Charlie Frago & Michael R. Wickline, Oil, Gas Commission
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February 17, 2009.
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Seth Blomeley, Measure on DNA Advances in House Proposal Calls
for Post-Arrest Samples, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 18, 2009.
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kidnapping, and first/second degree sexual assault.27 Following its
amendment, Creekmore again praised the Bill, observing that it
would save the state about $200,000, and solve cold cases.28 She
also observed that fifteen states have enacted similar laws.29 In
response to questioning about whether the new legislation, if
enacted, would violate the Fourth Amendment, Creekmore
responded that giving a post-arrest DNA sample is “reasonable”
and that Virginia’s similar statute has already withstood
constitutional scrutiny.30
Creekmore marshaled familiar support for the Bill: Juli Busken’s
mother testified in favor of the law, as did John Ramsey – father of
Jon-Benet Ramsey – whose name DNA cleared while he was
under investigation for the murder of his daughter.31 Creekmore
also told House members, “if you pass this bill, law enforcement
will not be driving around the state of Arkansas, pulling people
over, just to take their DNA.”32 Her testimony and the support
evidently paid off; the Bill passed the House on March 17, 2009,33
prompting Creekmore to characterize the Bill as the “21st-century
fingerprint.” The Senate subsequently approved Creekmore’s
measure on April 2,34 and the governor signed the Bill into law on
April 7.35
27

Seth Blomeley, Measure on DNA Advances in House Proposal Calls
for Post-Arrest Samples, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 18, 2009.
Significantly, although Juli Buskin was raped, the crime of rape is excluded
from Juli’s law. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2008) (providing rape
statute, which is excluded from Juli’s law), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124
(2008) (providing sexual assault in the first degree statute, which is included in
Juli’s law); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-125 (2008) (providing sexual assault in the
second degree statute, which is included in Juli’s law). Creekmore indicated
that rape was eliminated from the Bill because the number of yearly rapes would
make the legislation cost-prohibitive. Juli’s Law Now Arkansas Law, BENTON
COUNTY
COURIER,
Apr.
8,
2009,
http://www.bentoncourier.com/content/view/166473/1/.
28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Charlie Frago & Michael R. Wickline, Bill on Paying Employees
with Food, Clothing Falters, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 19, 2009.
33

Seth Blomeley, DNA Bill Advances Past Panel in House, ARKANSAS
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 18, 2009.
34

Charlie Frago & Michael R. Wickline, Lobbying Restriction Wins
House Ok, ARKANSAS-DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 2009.
Notably,
Creekmore was not successful the first time she presented the Bill to the Senate.
Charlie Frago, Bill Requiring DNA From Suspects Halted, ARKANSAS
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In its final form, Juli’s law requires:
a law enforcement official at the receiving criminal
detention facility [to] take, or cause to be taken, a
DNA sample of a person arrested for: (A) Capital
murder, § 5-10-101; (B) Murder in the first degree,
§ 5-10-102; (C) Kidnapping, § 5-11-102, (D)
Sexual assault in the first degree, § 5-14-124; or
Sexual assault in the second degree, § 5-14-125.[36]
The statute authorizes law enforcement to use “reasonable force”
in obtaining the sample, so long as they exercise that force in
“good faith.”37
A few additional points about the statute bear mention. First, the
statute defines DNA as “deoxyribonucleic acid that is located in
the cells of an individual, provides an individual’s personal genetic
blueprint, and encodes genetic information that is the basis of
human heredity and forensic identification.”38
Second, an
arrestee’s “DNA sample”39 is, after collection, (1) delivered to the
State Crime Laboratory,40 (2) retained in the State DNA Data
Bank;41 and (3) provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
storage in its Combined DNA Index System.42 Third, any
individual who refuses to provide a post-arrest DNA sample is
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 26, 2009. Indeed, the legislation failed in a Senate
committee based, in part, on legislators’ concerns about illegal arrests. Id.
35

Juli’s Law Now Arkansas Law, BENTON COUNTY COURIER, Apr. 8,
2009, http://www.bentoncourier.com/content/view/166473/1/.
36

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(a)(2)(A)-(E) (2009).

37

Id. §§ 12-12-1006(j)(1)-(2), 1006(k)(1)-(2). These provisions not
only allow officers to use reasonable force in DNA sample collection, but also
expressly exempt them from criminal and civil liability in exercising that force.
Id.
38

Id. § 12-12-1001(12).

39

The statute defines “DNA sample” as “a blood, saliva, or tissue
sample provided by any individual as required by this subchapter or submitted to
the State Crime Laboratory for analysis or storage, or both[.]” Id. § 12-121001(14). Notably, the statute does not define “fingerprint.”
40

Id. § 12-12-1006(g)(1).

41

Id. § 12-12-1006(g)(2).

42

Id. § 12-12-1105(a)(2). The FBI’s Combined DNA Index System, or
“CODIS,” “allows the storage and exchange of DNA records submitted by
federal forensic laboratories, state forensic laboratories, and local forensic
laboratories[.]” Id. 12-12-1001(4).
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guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.43 Finally, certain arrestees – e.g.,
those who were acquitted, never charged, or whose charges were
dismissed44 – may “apply to the State Crime Laboratory for
removal and destruction of the DNA record.”45 If successful, the
State Crime Lab removes the record from its system and “requests”
that the arrestee’s DNA record be purged from the national index
system.46
II.
This section focuses on the only judicial response to arrestee DNA
sampling laws. Although Arkansas has yet to opine on the
constitutionality of Juli’s law, the state is hardly alone in having
yet to resolve whether arrestee DNA sampling violates the Fourth
Amendment.47 Perhaps that explains why Creekmore relied on the
Virginia Supreme Court’s decision to uphold its arrestee DNA
sampling statute as a basis for seeking enactment of Juli’s law.
Regardless, one thing is clear: if the Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision to uphold its arrestee DNA sampling statute played a role
in the promulgation of Juli’s law, which it apparently did, the
court’s opinion in Anderson v. Commonwealth48 merits special
consideration with a critical eye.
In Anderson, defendant raped, robbed, and sodomized the victim
while she was walking to work in 1991.49 Following the crime,
43

Id. § 12-12-1006(i). As an aside, it seems counter-intuitive to charge
the arrestee who refuses to provide a DNA sample with a misdemeanor given
that officers are already allowed to use reasonable force to obtain the sample.
44

Id. § 12-12-1019(a)(1)-(2).

45

Id. § 12-12-1019(a).

46

Id. § 12-12-1019(d). The New York Times has already reported
problems defense attorneys are having in seeking to have DNA samples
expunged from those whose DNA sample was taken erroneously. Solomon
Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2009, at A1.
47

Local media has, however, misled Arkansas citizens into believing
that Juli’s law is similar to many other DNA collection statutes that courts
across the nation have already upheld as constitutional. New Law Allows Police
To Take DNA From Arrestees, 4029TV.COM, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://www.4029tv.com/print/19134460/detail.html/ (“Supreme Courts across
the country have upheld [arrestee DNA sampling] as constitutional.”). In
addition to ignoring the differences between collecting DNA from convicted
felons – as opposed to arrestees – the local media was also kind enough to
misquote my views on the subject. Id.
48

650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2473 (2008).

49

Id. at 703-04.
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physicians used a “physical evidence recovery kit” to collect and
preserve specimens taken from the victim – including DNA – for
evidence.50 The crime went unsolved until 2003 when defendant
was arrested on unrelated charges.51 Pursuant to Virginia’s postarrest DNA sampling statute,52 officers took a sample of
defendant’s DNA and entered it into a DNA databank that, in turn,
produced a “cold hit” matching DNA found on the victim.53
Pursuant to a search warrant, law enforcement obtained two
additional DNA samples from defendant, each of which confirmed
that he raped the victim.54 Defendant was subsequently found
guilty following a jury trial and sentenced to two life terms plus ten
years.55
On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that requiring him to
provide a DNA sample following an arrest for an unrelated crime
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.56 The Supreme Court of
Virginia disagreed and held that taking an arrestee’s DNA is part
of the “routine booking process,” which requires no additional
finding of individualized suspicion.57 The court reasoned that
taking an arrestee’s DNA is analogous to the taking of a
fingerprint.58 The court further reasoned that it, along with other
courts, had already held that taking a DNA sample from convicted
felons imposed no constitutional problem.59
What then is wrong with relying on Anderson as a basis for
enacting Juli’s law in Arkansas? First, the statute considered in
50

Id. at 704.

51

Id.

52

Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2009).

53

Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 704, 706.

57

Id. at 705.

58

Id. at 705-06.

59

Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705. Indeed, the court observed that other
courts have already held that “requiring a convicted felon to provide a blood,
saliva, or tissue sample for DNA analysis, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. (citing Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992)).
And yet, Murray relied in part on prisoners’ diminished privacy rights to find
the taking of DNA samples from convicted felons constitutional. 962 F.2d at
306 (“With the person’s loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least
some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”).
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Anderson is far different from the enacted version of Juli’s law.
Virginia’s arrestee DNA sampling statute provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
Every person arrested for the commission or
attempted commission of a violent felony as defined
in § 19.2-297.1 or a violation or attempt to commit
a violation of § 18.2-31, 18.2-89, 18.2-90, 18.2-91,
or 18.2-92, shall have a sample of his saliva or
tissue taken for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
analysis to determine identification characteristics
specific to the person. After a determination by a
magistrate or a grand jury that probable cause
exists for the arrest, a sample shall be taken prior to
the person's release from custody.[60]
As the italicized portion of the quoted statute indicates, the
Virginia statute includes at least a modest effort to provide
procedural safeguards. Indeed, although the Virginia statute
requires an independent judicial probable cause determination
prior taking the arrestee’s DNA, Juli’s law contains no similar
requirement.61 Although it would of course be constitutionally
preferable for that determination to focus on whether probable
cause exists to take a suspect’s DNA – as a opposed to the presence
of probable cause to believe the suspect has committed any crime –
the colloquial phrase “something’s better than nothing” comes to
mind.
Second, although the Anderson court candidly admitted that taking
a DNA sample is “more revealing” than a fingerprint,62 it
nonetheless subsequently asserted that the two procedures are
“analogous”63 – a conclusion unsupported either by commonsense
or science. From a commonsense standpoint, law enforcement
unsurprisingly learns the pattern of your finger following the
60

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2009) (emphasis added). As
discussed below, the Virginia statutory scheme neither has a definitions section,
nor does it authorize the taking of an arrestee’s DNA via blood sample.
61

Cf. Seth Blomeley, Measure on DNA advances in House Proposal
Calls for Post-Arrest Samples, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Mar. 18,
2009) (noting House testimony on Juli’s law suggesting that a judge verify the
existence of probable cause before taking an arrestee’s DNA).
62

Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705 (“A DNA sample of the accused taken
upon arrest, while more revealing, is no different in character than acquiring
fingerprints upon arrest.”).
63

Id. (asserting that the “taking of [defendant’s] DNA sample upon
arrest . . . is analogous to the taking of a suspect's fingerprints upon arrest”).
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unobtrusive taking of a fingerprint. Yet, even the layperson knows
that taking a DNA sample requires an intrusion into the body,
which thereafter reveals the totality of a person’s genetic makeup.
That elementary observation suggests that the Anderson court’s
reasoning is at best questionable and, at worst, laughable.
More substantively, the Anderson court considered whether the
government may constitutionally acquire an arrestee’s DNA via a
buccal, or cheek, swab.64 The question therefore becomes what
exactly does a buccal swab entail? A buccal swab itself is “a
cotton tipped stick which is placed into the mouth and rubbed
against the inside of the cheek to remove epithelial cells.”65
Significantly, this is the first of two intrusions into the person of
the arrestee. Although courts have characterized DNA swabs as
only “minimally intrusive,”66 they do so without recognizing the
second intrusion: the intrusion upon the arrestee’s interest in
keeping the information revealed by a DNA sample private.67
From a buccal swab, the state obtains an analyzable sample of an
arrestee’s DNA.68 That, in turn, allows the state to perform a
polymerase chain reaction procedure (“PCR”),69 which involves
64

Id. As an interesting aside, although the results of buccal swabs are
admissible in court, FBI guidelines direct federal law enforcement to rely on
blood samples to facilitate especially “reliable” DNA analysis. See United
States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
65

Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun
for Crime Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys? 40 AKRON
L. REV. 435, 449 n.153 (2007).
66

See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836-38; Murray, 962 F.2d at 307;
Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706.
67

Accord Sepideh Esmaili, Searching for a Needle in a Haystack: The
Constitutionality of Police DNA Dragnets, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 495, 507
(2007) (“Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the intrusion that
DNA testing involves, other state and federal courts addressing the issue have
failed to consider not just the intrusion that results from the procedure used to
obtain a sample, but also the intrusion upon the individual’s interest in keeping
private the information revealed by a sample.”).
68

Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and the
Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 912 n.41 (1988)
69

The federal government’s Human Genome Project Information
website describes the PCR process as follows:
A method for amplifying a DNA base sequence using a heatstable polymerase and two 20-base primers, one
complementary to the (+) strand at one end of the sequence to
be amplified and one complementary to the (-) strand at the
other end. Because the newly synthesized DNA strands can
subsequently serve as additional templates for the same primer
sequences, successive rounds of primer annealing, strand
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replicating the DNA sample.70 This replication then allows the
tester to look at “short tandem repeats” (“STR”).71 At this stage,
the STRs reveal specific areas of DNA known as “loci.”72 In total,
the tester is looking to isolate thirteen different loci in order to
identify an individual’s exact genetic makeup.73 Once complete,
that sample potentially “provides the instructions for all human
characteristics, from eye color to height to blood type.”74
elongation, and dissociation produce rapid and highly specific
amplification of the desired sequence. PCR also can be used
to detect the existence of the defined sequence in a DNA
sample.
Human
Genome
Project
Information,
Genome
Glossary,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/glossary/glossary_p.sht
ml (last visited May 20, 2009) (emphasis added). Although beyond the scope of
this Essay, it is perhaps worth noting that defendants are beginning to challenge
the method of implementing the PCR-STR analysis. People v. Jackson, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 474, 481-82 (Cal Ct. App. 2008) (challenging the prosecution’s use of
an “Identifier” test kit for performing the PCR-STR analysis).
70

Arcabascio, supra note 64, at 449 (noting that the federal CODIS
system uses PCR-STR testing). PCR-STR testing is considered best for
evaluating smaller samples of DNA, although a “restriction fragment length
polymorphism” (“RFLP”) analysis is used for larger samples. Armstead v.
State, 673 A.2d 221, 228 (Md. 1996). The three-step RFLP analysis seeks to
create a picture of the individual’s DNA via the creation of an “autoradiograph.”
Id. The bands on the autoradiograph represent fragments of DNA that, taken
together, create banding patterns that “can be used for identification by
comparing the banding pattern in the suspect’s DNA with the pattern derived
from DNA extracted from crime scene evidence.” Id. (citing J. McKenna et al.,
Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 283-84 (1994)).
71

Id. (“The following thirteen loci are used in the CODIS system:
CSF1PO, FGA, TH01, TPOX, vWA, D3S1358, D5S818, D7S820, D8S1179,
D13S317, D16S539, D18S51 and D21S11.”). “Loci” is the plural of “locus”
and represents “[t]he position on a chromosome of a gene or other chromosome
marker; also, the DNA at that position. The use of locus is sometimes restricted
to mean expressed DNA regions.” Human Genome Project Information,
Genome
Glossary,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/glossary/glossary_l.sht
ml (last visited May 20, 2009).
72

Arcabascio, supra note 64, at 449

73

Id.

74

Armstead, 673 A.2d at 227. Use of the word “potentially” is
appropriate in the body text. Significantly, DNA testers seek to create DNA
profiles by isolating “junk DNA,” so named because it was thought not to
contain “‘any known physical or medical characteristics.’” United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I)
(2000)); accord Goord, 430 F.3d at 656 n.3 (“DNA databases like New York’s
utilize ‘junk DNA,’ which does not (as far as we know) contain genetic
information.” (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818)). The validity of that thought is
waning; a study from the University of Iowa, released on October of 2008,
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All of this information is, of course, to be contrasted against the
Supreme Court’s observation that “fingerprinting involves none of
the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that
marks an interrogation or search.”75 With that in mind, it is
difficult to avoid snickering at the idea that the taking of a DNA
sample is “analogous” to the taking of a fingerprint.76
Putting aside for a minute the Anderson court’s reasoning,
compliance with Juli’s law intrudes on an arrestee’s person and
privacy even more so than does compliance with Virginia’s
arrestee DNA sampling statute. To begin with, unlike Virginia’s
statute,77 Juli’s law broadly defines “DNA sample” to provide the
state with varied methods of invading the arrestee’s body,
including saliva, tissue, and blood samples.78
More
problematically, unlike the federal mandate to avoid collecting
DNA in a manner that avoids learning an individual’s genetic
makeup,79 Juli’s law specifically aims to collect an arrestee’s
genetic blueprint by defining DNA to include “an individual’s
personal genetic blueprint, genetic information that is the basis of
human heredity and identification.”80 Even a generous extension
of Anderson’s already strained reasoning does not provide a basis
for upholding Juli’s law as constitutional.
Finally, the Anderson court summarily reasoned that arrestee
sampling is constitutional because a series of decisions have
already held that it is constitutional to require a convicted felon to
suggests that junk DNA may “evolve into exons, which are the building blocks
for protein-coding genes.” Lin L, Shen S, Tye A, Cai JJ, Jiang P, et al. Diverse
Splicing Patterns of Exonized Alu Elements in Human Tissues,
http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pgen.1000225 (last
visited May 20, 2009).
75

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).

76

It would instead be correct to say that DNA samples provide a
genetic fingerprint. DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence
Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74932, 74933 (Dec. 10,
2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (“DNA profiles, which embody
information concerning 13 ‘core loci,’ amount to ‘genetic fingerprints’ that can
be used to identify an individual uniquely.”).
77

There is no “definitions” section in Virginia’s DNA analysis and data
bank statutes.
78

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1001(14). In Virginia, the state may
acquire an individual’s DNA via blood sample only after a felony conviction.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (2009).
79

Amerson, 483 F.3d at 76.

80

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1001(12).
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provide a DNA sample.81 Specifically, citing the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Jones v. Murray, the court observed that other courts
have already held that “requiring a convicted felon to provide a
blood, saliva, or tissue sample for DNA analysis, does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.”82 The Jones decision itself relied in part
on that very distinction to find the taking of DNA samples from
convicted felons constitutional.83
Yet, that distinction is
meaningless in this context for the obvious reason that convicted
felons give up a significant privacy interest that arrestees who still
enjoy a presumption of innocence do not.84
The totality of the foregoing suggests two harsh realities: first, the
Anderson court’s reasoning is embarrassingly flawed. Second, any
reliance by Arkansas on Anderson as a basis either for enacting or
upholding Juli’s law is wholly unwarranted.
III.
In 2006, the D.C. Circuit considered the constitutionality of a
federal DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 provision
that requires convicted felons released on probation to provide a
DNA sample.85 Although the court upheld the provision by
reasoning that probationers have lesser privacy interests than do
ordinary citizens,86 the court observed, in passing, the following:
To be sure, genetic fingerprints differ somewhat
from their metacarpal brethren, and future
technological advances in DNA testing (coupled
with possible expansions of the DNA Act’s scope)
may empower the government to conduct wideranging ‘DNA dragnets’ that raise justifiable
citations to George Orwell.[87]

81

Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705.

82

Id. (citing Murray, 962 F.2d at 308).

83

Murray, 962 F.2d at 306 (“With the person’s loss of liberty upon
arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy
otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
84

See id. (identifying convicted felons, current inmates, and
probationers as the classes of people who possess diminished privacy rights).
85

Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

86

Id. at 496.

87

Id. at 499.
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DNA dragnets are now alive in Arkansas; as a result, residents are
now living the D.C. Circuit’s Orwellian concerns. Given that the
Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to evaluate the constitutionality
of Juli’s law, however, all hope is not lost.88 And, given that any
reliance by the court on Anderson as an analytical roadmap for
considering the issue would be imprudent, this section considers
what the Fourth Amendment analysis of Juli’s law could look like.
To be clear at the outset, collecting DNA from an individual’s
mouth is a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.89 The
question therefore becomes whether the Fourth Amendment’s text
requires the state to get a warrant before taking an arrestee’s DNA?
How to answer that question raises a familiar debate: does the
Fourth Amendment categorically impose a warrant requirement or,
instead, does the Amendment merely require that warrantless
searches be “reasonable”? That, in turn, begs the question of
whether there exists any connection between the Fourth
Amendment’s Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses.90
The Supreme Court’s early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
unequivocally suggested that searches conducted without a warrant

88

Although the Arkansas Supreme Court could uphold Juli’s law, that
does not necessarily mean the statute is constitutional pursuant to the federal
constitution. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116 (1998) (finding that a
search authorized by state law nonetheless violated the Fourth Amendment).
89

E.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2007);
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005). Of course, individuals
have no personal privacy rights in what they knowingly expose to the public.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Courts rightly reject that
analysis in the context of taking DNA samples. The Supreme Court has, for
example, distinguished the drawing of blood from the tone of a suspect’s voice:
although individuals generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
bodily fluids, they lack that same expectation in the sound of their voice because
the latter is knowingly exposed to the public. Compare United States v. Mara,
410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (noting “there is no more expectation of privacy in the
physical characteristics of a person’s script than there is in the tone of his
voice”), with Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17
(1989) (observing that the chemical analysis of blood and body fluids “can
reveal a host of medical facts” and “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that
society has long recognized as reasonable”).
90

The Reasonableness Clause in the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated[.]” U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Warrant Clause thereafter provides
“and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.” Id. A comma, not a semi-colon, connects the two
clauses.
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were presumptively “unreasonable.”91
That position was
forcefully reaffirmed by the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v.
United States,92 wherein it observed “that searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment –
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”93 Although the Court in the following two decades
approved of more exceptions to the warrant “requirement,”94 it
continued to periodically highlight the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Clause as the predominant clause.95
Amid the discussion of exceptions to the warrant “requirement,”
the Court also began exploring a new analytical path. In Terry v.
Ohio,96 a case decided one year after Katz, the Court observed that
“the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”97 That
shift in Fourth Amendment analysis, suggesting that the
Reasonableness Clause governs, took hold in a number of
subsequent cases.98 Perhaps Justice Scalia summed the tension up

91

See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964); Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); see also Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 614 (1961) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498
(1958) (“The decisions of this Court have time and again underscored the
essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from
unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.”).
92

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

93

Id. at 357.

94

See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (allowing
for warrantless searches of an arrestee’s car post-arrest); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-43 (1973) (allowing for warrantless searches
premised on an individual’s consent); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 76263 (1969) (allowing for warrantless searches incident to arrest).
95

See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (“It is a first principle of the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless they
first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so.”);
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (quoting from Katz); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762
(observing “the general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not
lightly to be dispensed with” (citation omitted)).
96

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

97

Id. at 19.

98

See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187-88
(2004); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
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best by noting that the Court’s Fourth Amendment “jurisprudence
[has] lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical
warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”99
In the Court’s most recent discussion of the Fourth Amendment,
the majority in Arizona v. Gant100 quoted from Katz and again
noted that “‘searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”101
Whether the Court’s reliance on that Katz language signals a return
to viewing the Warrant Clause as supreme remains unanswered.
Yet, finding an answer to that question is critical to resolving the
constitutionality of Juli’s law. Indeed, strict application of the Katz
language demands a straight-forward conclusion that Juli’s law is
unconstitutional: (1) the intrusion into an arrestee’s mouth is a
“search,” (2) there exists no recognized warrant exception for
acquiring an arrestee’s DNA, (3) officers must therefore have a
warrant to acquire that DNA, and (4) Juli’s law unconstitutionally
allows officers to search the body of an arrestee without a warrant.
Although that analysis simultaneously provides the benefits of
simplicity and brevity, it ignores the Court’s steady trend – Gant
notwithstanding – toward viewing reasonableness as the
“touchstone” of constitutionality.102 The change in the Court’s
attitude toward a warrant requirement is arguably best reflected in
language from California v. Acevedo,103 wherein it stated:
To the extent that the [warrant-requirement] rule
protects privacy, its protection is minimal. Law
enforcement officers may seize a container and hold
it until they obtain a search warrant. . . . “Since the
police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize
the property, we can assume that a warrant will be

U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
99

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
100

-- U.S. -- , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 485 (2009)

101

Id. at 493 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).

102

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).

103

500 U.S. 565, 575 (1991).
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routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority
of cases.”[104]
Given the modern Court’s apparent willingness to dispense with
the requirement of a neutral arbiter, this Essay proceeds on the
analytical assumption that the Arkansas Supreme Court would
review Juli’s law pursuant to a “reasonableness” test.105
When utilizing the “reasonableness” test, the Supreme Court
analyzes the particular law by balancing its intrusion on an
individual’s liberty interests as against the law’s promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.106 In applying that test, “the
reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the
facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement
against ‘an objective standard,’ whether this be probable cause or a
less stringent test.”107 Wholly apart from the presence of a
warrant, then, the Court still requires officers to possess at least
some objective individualized suspicion to justify the infringement
of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights. But, how much
individualized suspicion must an officer possess before taking an
arrestee’s DNA?
Answering that question seems to depend on what, if anything, a
court might require the officer to suspect. To justify taking an
arrestee’s DNA as “reasonable,” the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence could require the officer to first obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause to believe the arrestee’s DNA
is related to the basis for the arrest.108 Although probable cause is
a “fluid concept,”109 it is undoubtedly the most stringent Fourth
104

Id. at 575 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
105

See generally, e.g., Wofford v. State, 952 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Ark.
1997) (applying reasonableness inquiry to emergency exception); Burnett v.
State, 749 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Ark. 1988) (approving of Supreme Court’s
reasonableness analysis in Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)); Holden v.
State, 721 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Ark. 1986) (approving of Supreme Court’s
reasonableness analysis in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
106

See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999);
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
107

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.

108

There is, as yet, no recognized warrant exception for taking an
arrestee’s DNA, although one creative court has justified arrestee sampling as
part of the search incident to arrest exception. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 634
S.E.2d 372, 374-75 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 650 S.E.2d 702 (2007).
109

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
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Amendment standard and would obligate the magistrate to make a
“common sense” determination based on specific evidence that
there exists a “fair probability” that the arrestee’s DNA is related
to the crime for which he was arrested.110 Were this line of
reasoning to apply, Juli’s law would surely be unconstitutional
given that it allows for a suspicionless intrusion into the arrestee’s
body.
Alternatively, assuming a warrant is not required, the Court’s
Fourth Amendment caselaw could obligate the officer to
demonstrate that he has reasonable suspicion to believe that the
arrestee’s DNA is connected to the arrest. The Court’s decision in
Terry v. Ohio111 made constitutional certain limited intrusions on a
person’s liberty based on something less than probable cause.112
Specifically, an officer may stop an individual based on
“reasonable suspicion” to believe that criminal activity is afoot.113
If nothing during that stop dispels the officer’s suspicion, then he
may likewise engage in a pat down of the suspect’s outer
clothing.114 Even an intrusion on liberty premised on Terry,
however, requires some objective level of individualized suspicion
that Juli’s law does not. Thus, should arrestee DNA sampling
require reasonable suspicion, Juli’s law would again be
unconstitutional.115
Perhaps, though, because Juli’s law allows for a suspicionless
search of the arrestee’s person, it is more properly evaluated in the
context of the Supreme Court’s so-called “special needs”
jurisprudence.116 The still evolving “special needs” rule allows for
suspicionless searches when “‘special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and[/or] probablecause requirement[s] impracticable.’”117 To determine the validity
110

Id. at 238.

111

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

112

Id. at 7; see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

113

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.

114

Id.

115

Similar logic would of course dictate a conclusion that Juli’s law is
unconstitutional were officers required to (without a warrant) demonstrate
probable cause to believe there is a nexus between the taking of a DNA sample
and the basis for arrest.
116

Interestingly, the Anderson court rejected applying the special needs
doctrine, choosing (as previously discussed) to instead uphold its arrestee DNA
sampling law on the basis of “routine booking procedures.” 650 S.E.2d at 706.
117

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (quoting New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
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of policy or law allowing for a suspicionless search, the Supreme
Court applies a “general approach to the Fourth Amendment” to
determine reasonableness “by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”118
Relying on this analysis, the Court has upheld, inter alia, the
following suspicionless Fourth Amendment intrusions as
constitutional: (1) highway checkpoint stops during which officers
ask citizens about a recent crime;119 (2) sobriety checkpoints;120 (3)
brief seizures of motorists at border patrol checkpoints;121 (4)
work-related searches by government employers of employees’
desks and offices;122 (5) school officials searching some student
property;123 and (6) some governmental searches conducted
pursuant to a regulatory scheme.124 Given that government’s
“general interest in crime control” will not justify a suspicionless
search,125 the Supreme Court upholds certain laws pursuant to the
special needs doctrine when there exists “no law enforcement
purpose behind the searches” and “there [is] little, if any,
entanglement with law enforcement.”126

118
119

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004).

120

Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).

121

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976).

122

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).

123

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).

124

See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987)
(upholding New York law requiring junkyard owners to maintain records for
routine spontaneous inspections by police officers and state agents); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (upholding a statute that enabled federal mine
inspectors to inspect mining company’s quarries without a search warrant);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (upholding gun control law
allowing for warrantless “compliance checks” of individuals who were federally
licensed to deal in sporting weapons); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 538 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a city ordinance that gave city
building inspectors the right to enter any building at reasonable times in
furtherance of their code enforcement duties).
125

City of Indianapolis v, Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (declining to
allow the government to engage in a generalized narcotics-interdiction); see
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-80 (2000) (striking down state
hospital’s policy of routinely testing pregnant women for evidence of cocaine
use).
126

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (citations omitted).
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Against that backdrop, numerous federal courts have relied on the
Court’s “special needs” rationale to uphold certain federal DNA
collection statutes. Specifically, the federal courts have upheld
statutory provisions allowing for DNA collection from (1)
individuals on supervised release;127 (2) individuals on parole;128
and (3) convicted felons.129 Yet, in doing so, each court has
thematically relied on the status of the offenders to justify its
holdings; i.e., that convicted persons and parolees have a reduced
expectation of privacy.130 In fact, it is their very status as
127

United States v. Lujan, 504 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).

128

Banks v. Gonazales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1261 (N.D. Okla. 2006)
(upholding 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a(a)(2) in part because parolees have a
“significantly diminished expectation of privacy”); Miller v. United States
Parole Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177 (D. Kan. 2003) (applying special
needs doctrine to uphold taking parolee’s DNA based on his reduced
expectation of privacy).
129

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (“In light of conditional releasees’ substantially diminished expectations
of privacy, the minimal intrusion occasioned by blood sampling, and the
overwhelming societal interests so clearly furthered by the collection of DNA
information from convicted offenders, we must conclude that compulsory DNA
profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances.”). The Ninth Circuit carefully limited its holding solely to those
convicted for a qualifying federal offense and, in doing so, distinguished “‘the
rights of convicted felons’” from “‘free persons or even mere arrestees.’” Id. at
836 n.31 (quoting Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Although a federal statute allows the Attorney General to promulgate
regulations allowing federal law enforcement to correct DNA from arrestees, 42
U.S.C.S. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (Lexis 2009), no federal court has analyzed the
constitutionality of that provision. The issue is unlikely to remain dormant for
long; on January 9, 2009, the Department of Justice began implementing a rule
requiring U.S. agencies to collect DNA samples from “individuals who are
arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-United States persons who
are detained under authority of the United States.” DNA-Sample Collection and
Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg.
74,932, 74,935 (Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28). At least one
federal court has already struck down a somewhat similar state law allowing for
wide-ranging arrestee sampling. United States v. Purdy, No. 8:05-CR-204, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40433, **3-24 (D. Neb. Dec. 19, 2005) (providing excellent
analysis and holding Nevada’s arrestee sampling statute unconstitutional).
130

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (noting that convicted persons and
probationers “have a lesser expectation of privacy than the public at large.”);
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 833 (observing that “‘those who have suffered a lawful
conviction' are properly subject to a ‘broad range of [restrictions] that might
infringe constitutional rights in a free society’” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536
U.S. 24, 36 (2002))). Arkansas has likewise relied on a convicted felon’s
reduced expectation of privacy as a basis to uphold as constitutional the practice
of collecting a post-conviction DNA sample. Polston v. State, 201 S.W.3d 406,
411 (Ark. 2005) (“We agree with the State’s contention that because the privacy
rights of felons are diminished by virtue of their conviction and the intrusion of
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convicted individuals, parolees, or living while on supervised
release that provides the “special need” necessary to subject them
to the suspicionless taking of their DNA.131
There is no comparable “special need” to justify DNA sampling of
arrestees. Unlike felony convicts, probationers, and those on
supervised release, it is axiomatic that arrestees have no similar
diminishment of their reasonable expectation of privacy. Equally
as disconcerting, Juli’s law runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s
concern about suspicionless intrusions that have a “law
enforcement purpose behind the searches” and are “entangle[d]
with law enforcement.”132 In pushing for passage of the Juli’s law,
Creekmore admitted that a goal of Juli’s law is to help solve cold
cases.133 Accordingly, no honest application of the “special needs”
doctrine can justify the state’s generalized interest in solving
unspecified cold cases by taking DNA samples from certain
arrestees.
Even if the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that there exists a
“special need” to dispense with the need for any and all
individualized suspicion before acquiring an arrestee’s DNA, Juli’s
law is not narrowly tailored to justify tipping the balancing test in
the blood test is not significant, the privacy rights implicated by searches under
the DNA Act are minimal.”).
131

E.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. The Griffin Court expressly noted
that supervising an individual whose status is “probationer” is itself a “special
need”:
These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation serves
as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is
not harmed by the probationer’s being at large. These same
goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure
that the restrictions are in fact observed. Recent research
suggests that more intensive supervision can reduce
recidivism, and the importance of supervision has grown as
probation has become an increasingly common sentence for
those convicted of serious crimes. Supervision, then, is a
‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement
upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the
public at large.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 115-116 (2001) (relying on probationer’s diminished expectation of privacy
to uphold allowance of a warrantless search of probationer's home based only on
reasonable suspicion).
132

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (citations omitted).

133

Juli’s Law Now Arkansas Law, BENTON COUNTY COURIER, Apr. 8,
2009, http://www.bentoncourier.com/content/view/166473/1/.
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favor of the state. Courts upholding various DNA collection
statutes have thematically emphasized the need for those statutes to
be narrowly tailored in terms of offender status and qualifying
offense.134 In doing so, courts are quick to note that constitutional
statutes “provide[ ] adequate safeguards against collection of
unnecessary physiological information.”135 Constitutional DNA
collection statutes also include limitations on the manner in which
DNA information may be used for purposes other than
identification.136
Although Juli’s law limits qualifying felonies to capital murder,
murder, kidnapping, and first/second degree sexual assault,137 it of
course provides no limitation on offender status simply because an
arrestee, by definition, not an offender yet. The feeble rationale
underlying enactment of Juli’s law – that it will help absolve the
innocent while solving cold cases138 – could therefore
134

See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819 n.9 (“In light of these widely
varying measures, it is therefore particularly important to observe that we deal
here solely with the legality of requiring compulsory DNA profiling of qualified
federal offenders on conditional release.”); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679
(7th Cir. 2004) (noting a concern with whether Wisconsin’s DNA collection law
was “narrowly drawn”); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1999)
(highlighting the rate of recidivism among sexual offenders and emphasizing
that “the statute's requirement that imprisoned sexual offenders provide a DNA
sample will deter these individuals from committing future offenses of a similar
nature”); Murray, 962 F.2d at 304 (upholding statute limited to taking DNA
from convicted sex offenders).
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Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 80.
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United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); Rise,
59 F.3d at 1560.
137

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(a)(2)(A)-(E) (2009).
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Juli’s Law Now Arkansas Law, BENTON COUNTY COURIER, Apr. 8,
2009, http://www.bentoncourier.com/content/view/166473/1/. Proponents of
arrestee sampling have also argued that its “effect is not always that it puts
someone in prison. There have been cases where DNA has proven people’s
innocence, as well.” Julie Bisbee, DNA Sampling Faces Henry’s Verdict, THE
OKLAHOMAN, May 17, 2009, at 5A. The problem with that, as the New York
Times recently reported, is that prosecutors are opposing requests for DNA
testing by inmates seeking exoneration in about one of every five cases. Shaila
Dewan, Prosecutors Block Access to DNA Testing for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2009, at A1.
Proponents of arrestee sampling also sing the familiar refrain that
taking arrestees’ DNA is proper because they have nothing to worry about if
they are innocent. Michael McNutt, Measure Honors Memory of Slain OU
student; DNA testing proposal clears House, THE OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 7, 2008, at
1A (noting legislators remark, “[w]hy would an innocent person be worried
about having their DNA on record?”). The time for that tired fear-based logic
has passed; after all, “at what time does it invade our privacy sufficiently that
we’re going to get upset about it?” Opinion, Easy sell: Expanding DNA testing
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hypothetically also justify a law allowing police to go door-to-door
demanding that Arkansas residents provide a DNA sample. Juli’s
law also provides neither discernible protections to safeguard
against the collection of “unnecessary physiological information,”
nor limitations on the dissemination of an arrestee’s DNA.
Instead, the law leaves to the State Crime Law the job of
promulgating regulations related to the dissemination of an
arrestee’s DNA,139 and tacitly encourages the collection of
physiological information by broadly defining DNA to include an
“individual’s personal genetic blueprint.”140
Moreover, to say that Juli’s law is not narrowly tailored would be
an understatement.
The statute allows for the wholesale
warrantless DNA profiling of persons who have not yet been
convicted of anything while simultaneously providing no
protections to safeguard against the collection and dissemination of
their DNA. As a result, officers are free to take DNA samples
from certain arrestees even in the absence of any nexus between
the alleged crime and the information revealed by a DNA test.
Wholly apart from a special needs prerequisite,141 there is
seemingly little to discuss in the context of a generalized
no surprise, THE OKLAHOMAN, May 22, 2009, at 12A.
Solove said it best, though, when he observed:

Perhaps Professor

[T]he value of protecting the individual is a social one.
Society involves a great deal of friction, and we are constantly
clashing with each other. Part of what makes a society a good
place in which to live is the extent to which it allows people
freedom from the intrusiveness of others. A society without
privacy protection would be suffocating, and it might not be a
place in which most would want to live. When protecting
individual rights, we as a society decide to hold back in order
to receive the benefits of creating the kinds of free zones for
individuals to flourish.
Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 762 (2007).
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Id. § 12-12-1001(12).
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In evaluating DNA collection statutes, some courts dispense with
the special needs analysis and skip directly to reasonableness balancing. E.g.,
Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 426 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Weikert,
504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007). Those courts rely on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Samson v. California, to conclude that no special needs prerequisite
exists when evaluating the rights of prisoners or convicts. 547 U.S. 843, 848
(2006) (applying general reasonableness test and rejecting applicability of
special needs test to uphold the suspicionless search of parolee’s pockets, in
part, because of the parolee’s post-conviction status); see Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3
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reasonableness balancing. On the one hand is the state’s
aforementioned generalized interest in preventing and prosecuting
crimes and, on the other, is a two-fold privacy intrusion resulting
from the gathering and analyzing of an arrestee’s DNA. No court
believing that the Fourth Amendment retains any substance could
tip that scale in favor of upholding Juli’s law as constitutional.
Yet, concluding that Juli’s law is unconstitutional does not mean
that officers cannot obtain DNA from arrestees; it simply requires
a neutral and detached magistrate to first authorize a search inside
the body of the arrestee. Perhaps, then, it is finally time to dust off
and resurrect some faintly familiar logic:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.[142]
CONCLUSION
Whatever a constitutionally legitimate DNA collection system for
arrestees might look like, it is abundantly clear that Juli’s law does
not provide an example. From a commonsense standpoint,
reliance on Juli Busken’s case as a basis for enacting Juli’s law is
inapposite given that DNA was taken from her attacker while he
was in prison for another offense, not after his arrest. Moreover,
although Busken’s offender raped her before killing her, rape is
surprisingly excluded from Juli’s law.
From a constitutional standpoint, providing a post-conviction DNA
sample is acceptable because courts and scholars almost uniformly
(“We interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. California to require
that we join the majority of circuits in applying a ‘totality of the circumstances’
approach to the issues in this case, rather than the ‘special needs’ analysis used
by the minority of circuits.” (citations omitted)). Given the dissimilarity
between arrestee’s and convicted felon’s status, it is difficult to imagine the
Arkansas Supreme Court avoiding the special needs hurdle as it did when
upholding DNA sample collection from convicted felons. See Polston, 201
S.W.3d at 409-10 (rejecting (pre-Samson) the applicability of a special needs
exception when evaluating the constitutionality of taking DNA samples from
convicted felons and implicitly relying on felons’ status as a basis for doing so).
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Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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agree that defendants forfeit significant privacy rights following a
felony conviction. At the risk of stating the obvious, the same is
hardly true of those who are merely arrested for committing a
Juli’s law felony. Any faithful application of any aspect of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence therefore demands holding that
arrestee sampling as allowed by Juli’s law is unconstitutional.
In the end, “[I’m] all for getting the bad guys, but not this way.”143
Methods are already in place for obtaining DNA samples from
those charged with a crime; prosecutors need only show to
magistrate probable cause to believe that the reason for obtaining
the DNA is related to the basis for the arrest.
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Opinion, Fishing Trip: DNA Legislation Casts Net Too Wide, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 19, 2009, at 6A.
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